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lntroduction 
How does competition3 among agents impact the evolutionary pro-
cesses4 of international political systems? The answer to this question requires 
primarily the ontological delimitation of the objects in analysis5. lt will be 
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3 In this work, competition and conflict of interests are treated like synonyms and are defined 
as: ~a form of interaction among individuais, groups, organizations and collectivities which 
irnplies shocks to the access and the distribution of the scarce resources· (Pasquino 1998, zz5). 
Moreover, it should be pointed out, that the aim is not to identify the causes of conflicts, but its 
consequences to the evolving process of the dellinited objects of analysis. 
4 By evolution, one understands the sequence of transformations in the components of social 
systems, not implying the normative content ofthese changes (Vasconcellos ZOIJ, 85). 
5 It is important to emphasize that ~systems~ are understood as the logical models that repre-
sent entities formed by sets of elements interacting (Bertuglia and Vaio zoo5, 3). Therefore, 
the ontological definition of a system deals with the •criteria of distinction that indicate what 
we speak of and specifies its properties as being, unity or obje~ (Maturana and Varela zoo5, 
47). However, defining them ontologically does not irnply that physical and social reality is a de 
facto system (Wight zoo6). In other words, the analytical validity of instantiation and opera-
tionalization of such models will always be subject to empirical conditions. As Reis (r997, r9) 
argues: •Whether these conditions are observed or not, so that we can describe the societies 
we study from those models, or if the system as we define it adequately describes the set of 
phenomena we want to analyze, are empirical questions, which we will answer affirmatively, 
or at times negatively. But we can perfectly, on a purely logical-analytical basis, discuss whether 
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defined that intemational political systems (IPS) have an anarchic structure, 
being composed mainly by the interactions6 that involve the use or threat of 
the use of the force among political organizations which are not subordinated 
to a higher authority able to impose limits on the behavior of agents (Waltz 
1979; Buzan and Little 2000, 92). National poZitical systems7 (NPS), on the oth-
er hand, have a hierarchical structure, being formed by interactions between 
individuais and organizations in territories in which there is an organization 
that concentrates the coercive means and imposes limits for the behavior of 
the agents (Waltz 1979; Elias 1993; Geuss 2001). StatesB, in turn, will be both 
the constituent units of intemational political systems and the organizations 
that monopolize coercive means in national political systems (Tilly 1996; H ui 
2005; Levy and Thompson 2011). 
It is assumed that the variations in the degrees of concentration of 
coercive means9 distinguish the nature and consequences of competition 
between the agents of each system (Waltz 1979, 92). It is argued that the 
absence of central govemment makes competition in international political 
systems involved in the survival of state political organizations, which conse-
quently constrains the possibilities of increasing the functional specialization 
between them. On the other hand, the concentration of the means of coercion 
in national political systems imposes limits on the use of force in conflicts 
of interest, which in turn reduces the insecurity of agents and allows the in-
crease of division oflabor in the system (Elias 1993). 
According to the agents and means involved, three dimensions of 
these or those conditions are really necessary or not for the reproduction of a system as it is 
defined in given work". 
6 Interaction is understood as the set of relations that makes the parts of a system interdepen-
dent with each other. 
7 It is emphasized that the concept of national political systems does not refer only to social 
systems in which there are political organizations called nation-states. lhe concept wi1l be used 
to characterize any social system in which there was monopolization of the means of coercion 
by a state organization, whether that organization is a city-state, an empire, a kingdom, etc. 
8 lhe terms political organizations, units, states and agents will be used as synonyms of the 
components of the international political systems. Furthermore, we will refer to states with •s~ 
minusrule when dealing with political organizations that exercise or aim to exercise control of 
the means of force in a given territory. In this sense, the term can represent Empires, city-sta-
tes, city leagues, kingdoms, etc. The term State with the capital "S" wi1l be used when referring 
to political organizations formed after the end of the feudal order in Western Europe. That is, 
referring to the National States that are constituted like the predominant political organization 
in ali the continents at the present time. 
9 Coercion means the irnposition of the will of one agent on the other through the use or threat 
of the use of force. Coercive means consist of the material resources necessary for one agent to 
exercise coercion over another (Giddens .2001, 37). 
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social competition will be identified: the Intemational Competition, charac-
terized by competitive interactions that cornprise the use or threat of use of 
force between political organizations in IPS, and which involves the material 
capabilities and organizational elernents that sustain the use of force in the 
intemational arena; the Construction ofthe Statero, characterized by the com-
petitive interactions between the state, organizations and individuais around 
resource extraction and control in NPS, and which concems the ways in which 
political organizations achieve the rnonopoly of the rneans of coercion and 
well establish legitimacy for their domination in a delimited territory; and, 
finally, Regulated Cornpetition, characterized by disputes between non-state 
organizations and individuais on rnatters of distribution oflife probabilities 
within national poli ti cal systemsrr, and which in volves the ways that the reg-
ulation imposed by the states influences the distribution of life probabilities 
within the NPS. 
Delirniting the objects of analysis, it is defined as a working hypoth-
esis that the results of the interactions between the agents according to the 
strategies chosen by thern to cope with the cornpetition they face cause chang-
es in the structure of the intemational political systerns and in the character-
istics of the state political organizations. 
To dernonstrate the argurnent, the article is divided into two sections. 
The first section questions the conditions under which cornpetition between 
states engenders rnechanisrns that reinforce processes of concentration of co-
ercive means in intemational political systems. Firstly, it is assessed that the 
assurnptions of anarchy and low functional specialization present in the rnod-
el proposed by Kenneth Waltz (1979) do not necessarily irnply the existence 
of only one rnechanisrn acting on the IPS. In fact, it is argued that, because 
intemational political systerns are open systerns, the interactions among its 
agents allow the ernergence1" of cornpeting rnechanisrns, which rnay favor 
10 lhe term "state-buildingn will be employed to characterize conflicts ofinterest between sta-
te, non-state organizations and individuais within national political systems. The term "state 
formationw will be used to characterize historical processes in which political organizations 
have been formed. 
11 Thus, three sources ofliterature are evaluated. lhe understanding ofhow a structure of po-
litical systems in general constraints the behavior of units - International Relations Theory - is 
complemented by the weighting on how human resources produced and extracted in democra-
tic systems - Historical Soci.ology -, as well as by the analysis of the logistical and operational 
conditionings that sustains the activity of war - Strategic Studies. 
12 Emergence is the process in which phenomena that cannot be apprehended from the sum 
of the isolated behaviors of the constituent units arise at the systemic levei (Holland 2012). The-
re is no need for central planning. Organizational patterns emerge from interactions among 
agents and become irreducible to them (Abbot 2oo6). 
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both concentration and distribution of means of coercion. Finally, it will be 
analyzed the explanatory model proposed by Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2005) on 
the transformation of the kingdom system in China to an empire under the 
Qin dynasty during the period of656-221 BC. 
The second section questions how intemational competition influ-
ences the d.imensions of state building and of regulated competition within 
national political systems. Firstly, it is distinguished ontologically the states 
from the other agents belonging to the NPS. It is considered that the specific-
ity o f the state political organizations consists in the execution of three activi-
ties: monopolization ofthe means of coercion within the NPS; imposition of 
orders ofbehavioral regulation to the other agents; and defense against other 
political organizations (Tilly 1996; Waltz 1979; Giddens 2001). 
Then, it is argued that the regulatory orders are not neutral in rela-
tion to regulated competition. Indeed, they will tend to favor individuais and 
organizations that dorninate the resources necessary for states to accomplish 
their purposes (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). In addition, to the extent 
that state actors concentrate the resources needed to carry out these three 
tasks, they will have greater autonomy from other NPS organizations. In turn, 
if these resources are concentrated in other actors, state interventions will 
tend to reflect the interests of those actors. Finally, the explanatory model pro-
posed by Tilly (1975; 1985; 1996) on the effects of international competition 
on the process of formation and consolidation of nation-states in Europe is 
analyzed. 
lnternational Political Systems: competition and evolution of 
the structure 
Understanding the nature of competition in a social system requires 
the ontological delimitation of three elements: boundaries, mechanisms, and 
structure (Gilpin 1981). Borders refer to both the conditions necessary for 
the inclusion of components in the model and the interactions between the 
system and its environment. In other words, to the delirnitation of what is 
inserted and what is excluded from the system, which allows us to understand 
how exogenous variables interfere with its functioning (Maturana and Varela 
2005). Mechanisms are the plausible and often observed forms in which pro-
cesses of change occur (Pierson 2000). 
The structure refers to the way the units are ordered in relation to one 
another. The structurallevel indicates: "a general description of the ordered 
overall arrangement of a sodety written in terms of the placement of units 
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rather than in terms of their qualities" (Waltz 1979, 9). Identifying the ele-
ments that com pose the structure matters for the evaluation of the constraints 
imposed on the units, as well as for formulating hypotheses about their be-
haviors (Carlsnaes 1992). 
lt is defined as necessary conditions for a unit to belong to the IPS: 
(i) a political organization that concentrates the means of coercion in a de-
limited territory and (ii) has the capability of action at the intemational arena 
(Waltz 1979; Rosenau 1997; Jervis 1997; Cusack and Stoll 1994)1J. In other 
words, agents in IPS are entities composed of various subgroups, organiza-
tions, communities, and many individuais that are sufficiently cohesive to 
possess agency quality (Buzan and Little 2000, 101). This means that the IPS 
units (aggregates of institutions and individuais) are able to interpret, plan 
and execute actions that do not derive solely from constraints and structural 
incentives14 (Friedman and Starr 1997). 
However, although we recognize that states interact in a number of 
ways, we will not include ali kinds of interactions in our analysis. This is be-
cause, as Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2ooo, 76) point out, different types 
of interaction, and therefore different types of units become more or less 
prominent depending on the sectoral lens used to analyze the intemational 
system. Therefore, even recognizing the importance of cultural and economic 
interactions for international relations (Watson 1992; Wendt 1999; Arrighi 
2010), the model is restricted to interactions involving coercion, that is, the 
use or threat of use of force (Geuss 2001)'S. 
Th.e structure of the system will be described based on two assump-
tions presented in the model proposed by Kenneth Waltz (1979). The first 
is that intemational political systems are ontologically anarchic, that is, they 
have no central authority. Th.is assumption derive from the conception that 
the capacity of action of political organizations in the intemational arena de-
pends on their prerogative (and their capacity) to define and execute inde-
pendent externai actions'6• Because of this, the distribution of the means of 
13 The ontology and evolutionary processes of agents of intemational political systems wil1 be 
evaluated in the next section. For the moment, it should be pointed out, that the autonomous 
capacity for action in the international sphere is a necessary condition for the membership of a 
political organization in the IPS model ofthis study (Waltz 1979; Buzan 1984; Watson 1992). 
14 like Waltz (1979), one assumes that, although they have several objectives, all states seek 
first to ensure their survival in intemational political systems. 
15 Cultural economic interactions wil1 be evaluated as exogenous variables to the model, that is, 
to the extent that they influence how competi. tive interactions involving the use or the threat of 
use of force between states influence the evolution of the IPS structure. 
16 lt is important to emphasize that to assume that intemational political systems are ontolo-
gically anarchic and that their units have an autonomous capacity of choice does not irnply the 
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coercionl'l in the system cannot be concentrated to the point where one unit is 
able to totally regulate the actions of the others. In other words, it is obvious 
that there is no agency without the capacity of action (Buzan 1984). 
Decentralization of the means of force in an IPS creates in itself un-
certainty about the behavior of its agents. In other words, the absence of cen-
tral govemrnent makes international competition18 permeated by constant in-
formational incompleteness about the intentions and real capabilities of the 
units. Thus, only possessing the means of force necessary to defend oneself 
from others is that states can ensure the continuity of their own existence 
(Waltz 1979· 74)19• 
Once the anarchic ontology ofthe IPS structure is delimited, one can 
deduce how the socialization-selection mechanism operates in its evolution-
ary process. According to Checkel (2oo6, 364): "socialization refers to the 
process of inducting new actors to the norms, rules and ways of behavior of 
a given community". lbat is, the tendency for agents' behavior to conform to 
the constraints imposed by the structure (Elias 1993). As argued above, the 
anarchic structure of the IPS makes the nature of intemational competition 
involve the survival of states. Because of this, war becomes a fundamental 
element of socialization-selection in intemational political systems, both by 
eliminating agents who do not adapt to structural pressures and by encourag-
ing the emulation of perceived winning strategies (Levy and Thompson 2011, 
61; Posen 1993, 82). 
The second ontological assumption of the structure model proposed 
absence ofhierarchical relations between states. What, in fact, the absence of central authority 
implies is that it is the distribution of the means of force in the system that defines which units 
will suffer the greatest structural constraints in their actions (Gilpin 1981, 28). 
17 Anthony Giddens (2001, 85) argues that ~the resources involved in the reproduction of social 
systems that have some degree of continuity in space and time form aspects of the structural 
properties ofthese social systems.· In this sense, it was delimited in this study that the intema-
tional political systems refer to the interactions that involve the use or threat of the use of force 
between states. Because of this, the way in which the means of coercion are distributed is also 
a defining element of the structure of this type of system. 
18 To suppose that international political systems are ontologi.cally competitive does not mean 
to exclude the possibility of cooperation between states. It implies only recognizing that coope-
ration initiatives will always be permeated by rnistrust derived from informational uncertainty 
regarding the motivations of the parties involved, as well as the inexistence of a central autho-
rity capable of ensuring behavioral control. 
19 It is emphasized that the ability to defend militarily from externai aggressions is not the 
only means that allows the survival of a state in the IPS. In fact, there are innumerable cases of 
states that do not have the means necessary to withstand externai aggression and continue to 
exist. However, it is argued that such states have their capaáty for action in the IPS extremely 
constrained. 
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by Waltz is that there is low functional differentiation in the IPS. According 
to Buzan and little (2ooo), functional differentiation in social systems occurs 
when units specialize, assuming specific tasks and objectives. In these cases, 
the agents become interdependent due to the social division of labor. lhis 
condition acts as a constraint on individual action, since the survival of a unit 
depends not only on its own capabilities, but also on the activities carried out 
by the others. Agents that perform similar functions.,0 will depend less on 
each other and, consequently, will maintain greater autonomy in the systems 
in which they are inserted (Elias 1993, 206). 
It is argued that different leveis of coercion imply different possibili-
ties of functional differentiation. lhe lower the concentration, the greater the 
behavioral uncertainty and the greater will be the insecurity. lherefore, the 
smaller will be the structural incentives for increasing the division oflabor. As 
the monopolization of force increases, behavioral uncertainty decreases, and 
insecurity is reduced with it. Consequently, the division oflabor between the 
units may intensify (Waltz 1979, 104). According to Norbert Elias (1993, 198, 
emphasis added): 
[ ... ] societies without a stable monopoly of force are always those in which 
the division of functions is relatively small, and the chains of actions that 
bind individuais to one another relatively short [ ... ]. By forming a monopoly 
of force, peaceful social spaces are created, which are normally free from 
acts of violence. The pressures acting on these spaces are different from 
those that existed before. 
lhus, one disagrees with Hendrick Spruyt's statement that "the con-
dition of anarchy implies the existence of a particular type of unity" (Spruyt 
1994, 13). In the context of interactions involving force, when one ora few 
political organizations monopolize the means of coercion and impose orders 
of behavioral regulation on others, anarchy begins to change. At the limit, 
such a change would alter the structural constraint that induces agents to 
build means of coercion that ensure their survival. In this case, states would 
become "free to specialize because they have no reason to fear the increased 
interdependence that goes with specialization" (Waltz 1979, 104). We would 
be facing the end of a system composed of the interaction between independ-
20 It is important to point out that this study refers to the functional similarity between states 
only in the context of international competition and the concentration of the means of coercion 
in the NPS. That is, it is considered as a necessary condition for defining the agents in the IPS 
that political organizations are able to defend themselves against externai aggressions and con-
centrate the means of coercion in their respective NPS. However, it is clear that, in addition to 
these two functions, each state can perforrn specific tasks. 
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ent political organizations and the subsequent formation of a single global 
political system. 
Therefore, although one can agree with the assumptions of anarchy 
and the low functi.onal specialization present in the Waltzian model, it pre-
sents a theoretical gap by omitting certain dynamics that act in the evolu-
tionary processes of the IPS. According to Waltz, his definition of structure 
necessarily implies the emergence of the balance of power mechanism (Waltz 
1979, 121). That is, according to him, as long as there is no single central 
authority, the behavior of the units will result in a tendency to restare the de-
concentration of the means of force in the system (Waltz 1986, 53). 
However, it is argued that the assumptions of anarchy and low func-
tional specialization do not necessarily imply the existence of only one mech-
anism, which would always encourage the restoration of the deconcentration 
of force in the system. In fact, there is the emergence o f multiple mechanisms 
that strengthen distinct and even conflicti.ng evolutionary trajectories (Hui 
2005, r). 
The concept of mechanism, in turn, is the subject of intense con-
troversy in the literature (Elster 1989; Tilly and Goodin 2006; Archer 2015). 
Nevertheless, it is noted that there is relative consensus in the conception that 
they represent the ways in which one variable produces effects in another 
(Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010). Roy Bhaskar (1998 34) argues that "mecha-
nisms combine to generate the flow of phenomena that constitute the pres-
ent states and events of the world". Charles Tilly and Richard Goodin (2oo6, 
13) point out that mechanisms generate energy transfers between elements 
and rearrangements in the positioning ofunits. Anna Grzymala-Busse (2on, 
1268) considers that "the analysis of mechanisms and processes involves tem-
porality, to the extent that mechanisms specify change: how and why transfor-
mations, trends and developments occur". 
It is argued that the distincti.ons in the meanings attributed to the 
concept of mechanisms lie in the fact that their explanatory logic depends on 
the ontology of the evaluated system. In closed systems, in which interacti.ons 
with the environment and number of elements can be controlled, mecha-
nisms describe functi.onal relationships between pairs of variables. That is, 
the trajectory of events that starts with changes in a certain independent varia-
ble and generates changes in a dependent variable (Vasconcellos 2013, 81). In 
this case, the evolutionary trajectory of the system will tend to be linear, since 
the sum of the individual acti.ons is equal to the aggregate behavior (Mitchell 
2009, 22). 
On the other hand, in open systems in which the influences of ex-
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ogenous variables and the number of interactions between units are high'11, 
mechanisms do not operate in the same way (Bhaskar rgg8). Dueto the inter-
connection between agents, it is impossible to act alone in this type of system 
(Hardin 1963). Because of this, small modifications ata specific point can 
trigger disproportionate andj o r unexpected consequences in their general 
state (Elster rg8g). Thus, "organizations may not fully appreciate the implica-
tions of what they are doing, and it may take a long time for the consequences 
of their actions to emerge in fu11 form" (Levy and Thompson 2011, n). Fur-
thermore, the causal relationships between its components may be recursive 
(Jaccard and Jacoby 2009). That is, although one particular entity X has an 
effect on another entity Y, there is nothing to prevent that in a second moment 
Y also has an effect on X. 
Thus, the evolution path of open systems is not linear. Since "a con-
tinuous change of the value of one variable may lead to discontinuous be-
havior of the entire system" (Wimmer 2006, 8), transformations can occur 
both gradually and abruptly. In such contexts, mechanisms that reinforce ten-
dencies of change (mechanisms of positive feedback), and mechanisms that 
operate in the restoration of the initial state (negative feedback. mechanisms) 
both act according to Thelen (2003) and Hui (2005). 
Finally, dueto interactions with the externai environment, the changes 
in the system are irreversible (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). In other words, 
systemic dynamics depend not only on changes in variables but also on the 
specific time trajectory in which these changes occurred (Pierson 2004). 
Therefore, not only can similar actions produce different effects depending 
on when they occur, but also choices in a given period constrain the possibil-
ities of alternative paths in the future (Thelen 2003). 
International political systems are open social systems and composed 
of the interactions between a significant number of units. Therefore, their 
evolutionary processes are necessarily unpredictable and the result from the 
strategic interactions between agents, exogenous variables and competing 
mechanisms (Hedstrom and Yli.koski 2010, 6o). In other words, interactions 
involving the use or threat of the use of force between states do not necessar-
ily imply the deconcentration o f the means of force in the system, and indeed 
there are multiple possible trajectories of evolution for the IPS. 
In this sense, it is possible to summarize the relationship between 
21 The number of elements matters, since as it expands, it becomes increasingly diffirult to 
identify exclusively independent variables, as well as the measurement of effects {Pierson 
2004)· 
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agents and structure in the IPS in the following stages: in a first momenP", 
the intemational competition in an anarchic structure constrains the behavio-
ral variability of the states. Such pressures encourage the units to seek means 
to ensure their survival, but are assimilated and answered according to the 
specific characteristics of each agent. In a second moment, from the interac-
tions between the strategies chosen by each state to face intemational com-
petition emerge transformational mechanisms2 J that produce e:ffects on the 
structurallevel. Tendencies are generated both towards the decentralization 
ofthe means offorce and their concentration (Braumoller 2012). 
Therefore, to the extent that "the contingency and flux of the social 
world, in where multiple mechanisms are also constantly interacting, mech-
anisms cannot be deterministic" (Wight 2015, 52). In this sense, the incon-
sistency of the Waltzian model consists in the omission of mechanisms that 
could overcome the tendency to balance24. Thus, the question is to know un-
der what conditions intemational competition engenders mechanisms that 
reinforce processes of concentration of coercive means in international polit-
ical systems. 
Victoria Tin-bor Hui {2005) advanced in this regard by analyzing the 
process of transformation of the IPS formed by sovereign kingdoms in an-
cient China into a unified national political system in the Qin Dynasty during 
the period 656-221 BC"5. The author assumes that this IPS was characterized 
by anarchy and intense competition among its units (Hui 2005, 5). This di-
agnosis is in accordance with the analysis of Kiser and Cai (2003, 519), who 
consider that: "there were only 38 peaceful years between 772-485 BC, and 
only 8g between 463-222 BC". However, with the expansion of the Qin King-
dom, the anarchic structure o f the system did not engender mechanisms that 
22 Starting the analysis by the effects of the structure on the units does not rnean assigning 
temporal precedence to thern. As argued in the 6rst part of this paper, to discem the effects on 
agent-structure relations, one rnust consider the time trajectory in which they occur (Friedrnan 
and Starr 1997). Thus, one could have begun by evaluating the effects ofthe units on the struc-
ture without any analytical impairment 
23 According to Hedstrom and Ylikoski (zo10, 59), situati.onal mechanisrns are those by which 
social structures constrain individual actions. On the other hand, transformati.onal mechanis-
ms are those by which individuais, through their actions and interactions, generate several 
intentional and unintentional results and change the structure. 
2.4 In fact, despite not elaborati.ng the argurnent, Waltz suggests at certain moments the possi-
bility of overcorning the logic of anarchy by the I PS agents. 
2.5 The work of Hui (zoo5) will be analyzed, since the author uses the model of internati.o-
nal politi.cal systern of Kenneth Waltz like theoretical presupposition. However, it is irnportant 
to note that there is a consistent research agenda on the influence of war in the process of 
Qin ldngdom expansion. See: Mann (1986), Wong (1997), Kiser and Cai (2003), Lewis (zoo6, 
2007)· 
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would impede the concentration of the force means. 
Hui (2005) argues that initially the Chinese international political 
system evolved according to the assumptions of the Waltzian model. That is, 
international competition and the mechanism of socialization homogenized 
the behavior of agents. Thus, not only did political organizations become mil-
itarized, they also waged wars, formed alliances, and established diplomatic 
contacts during periods ofpeace. Moreover, in the period from 656 BC to 284 
BC, balancing alliances and increased power projection costsa6 sustained the 
anarchic structure. That is, ali the states that tried to dominate the agency of 
the other units in that period "perished as a result of the mechanism of the 
balance of power and the rising costs of expansion" (Hui 2005). 
However, although the structure of the IPS has led to the adoption 
of similar behavior by the units, each kingdom opted for different strategies 
to face international competition. According to the author, the Qin Kingdom 
would have responded through internai administrative reforms which as-
sured it relative advantages over its competitors. Victoria Tin-bor Hui called 
this type of action a strengthening reform: "efforts to increase military and 
economic capabilities by enhancing the state's administrative capability" (Hui 
2005, 79). Three dimensions are fundamental to the success of this strate-
gy: the establishrnent of conscript national armies, the bureaucratization of 
administrative staff and the imposition of a centralized tax system. Table 1 
summarizes the characteristics of each dimension as well as its effects from 
the externai and internai point of view on the capacities of the states: 
Table 1: Strengthening Reforms: lnternational Competition 
and State Formation 
Strengthening Reform lnternational Competition State Formation 
Conscripted and perma-
lncreased number of Monopolization of means 
combatants and of coercion and creation of 
nent national armies. 
effectiveness in combat. administrative apparatus 
Bureaucratization: 
Mobilization of resources lncreased administrative 
meritocratic criteria for 
and contrai of conquered capacity and facilitation of 
the training of 
administrative staff. 
territories. behavioral control. 
26 The increase in the costs of force projection refers to the fact that it becomes economically 
costly for the state to sustain the material and human resources necessary to secure domina· 
ti.on in places far from its base (Gilpin 1981, 103). It is based on this observati.on that the con· 
cept ofloss of the force gradient is conceived, which indicates the increase in the diffirulti.es of 
projecting military power in regi.ons geographically distant from the state base, mainly through 
large bodies ofwater (Boulding 1962; Mearsheimer 2001). 
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More resources for internai 
Centralized tax system. 
Larger and more reliable domination. Reduced influ-
sources of funding for wars. ence of other organizations 
and private actors. 
Source: Adapted from H ui [2005). 
The beginning of the strengthening reforms in the Qin Kingdom 
comes with the arrival of Prime Minister Shang Yang in the middle of 359 
BC (Kiser and Cai 2003)2 7. Taking advantage of technological innovations in 
military equipmenP8, Yang established large-scale conscription in Qin-con-
trolled territories (Lewis 2007, 31)2.9. Thereafi:er, ali men between the ages of 
15 and 6o could be recruited to combat (Kiser and Cai 2003, 520). In this 
context, the fighting forces of the kingdom began to be composed not only of 
carriage-mounted cavalry formed by fighters from the agrarian aristocracy 
but also by infantry made up of masses of peasant soldiers (Hui 2005, 8o). In 
addition, systems of punishment and inducements for cowardice ar bravery 
in combat were instituted: "Anyone who gained merit in battle by slaying en-
emies ar commanding victorious units was rewarded with promotion" (Lew-
is 2007, 32). This model became "the most important form of aclúevement 
in this era", as "military merit was to be more important than noble birth" 
(Hsu 1965, 73, cited in Kiser and Cai 2003, 521). In addition, the formation of 
ever larger armies led to the construction of institutions capable of managing 
the necessary logistical imperatives to sustain such a force projection (Lewis 
1990, 9). Therefore, it is noted that not only did Qin's capabilities increase in 
relation to the other IPS states, but also that the state strengthened vis-a-vis 
private power holders (Kiser and Cai 2003, 520). 
The bureaucratization of the administration, by diminishing the in-
fluence of the agrarian elites, was another element that contributed to the 
increase of the capacity of intervention of the state in the national political 
system. Gradually, instead of the nobility, the state was dominated by a single 
autocratic ruler, whose agents recorded and mobilized the peasants for state 
service, as well as collecting the taxes that sustained the military expansion 
(Lewis 2007, 32). The territory was divided into 36 administrative districts 
27 Shang Yang had previously served in the Wei Kingdom, where he also introduced strengthe· 
ning reforms on a smaller scale. Its importance in implementing reforms in the Qin Kingdom 
suggests the relevance of the diffusion of technological innovation as a rnechartism that media· 
tes the effects of international cornpetition on agents. 
28 Among the technological innovations that have contributed to the massification of arrnies 
are the invention of the beast and the developrnent of cheaper brass swords and spears. 
29 Despite diffi.culties in obtaining reliable data for this period, Kiser and Cai (2003) estirnate 
that the total contingent of the Qin army would reach between soo,ooo soldiers. 
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that were identical to military recruitment units and were divided into sub-
units controlled by officials nominated by the sovereign (Rosenstein 2009). 
In these districts, designations of o:fficers by rnerit have increased over those 
achieved by heredity. In addition, codes with central state laws began to be 
published in ali regions of the kingdorn and civil servants were required to 
send detailed annual reports on the conditions of each locality. 
In order to reduce the costs related to the behavioral control of the 
other NPS agents, the population was divided into groups formed by 10 fam-
ilies at most. If an individual comnútted any transgression, the whole group 
to which he belonged was held accountable. However, if the criminal was 
reported to the authorities, the group would receive benefits on lands and 
o:fficial positions. According to Kiser and Cai (2003, 528), the advantage of 
such a form of control was that "[t]his kind of social control mechanisrn held 
everyone under fairly constant local supervision and thus made tax collection 
and military recruitment much easier". 
Regarding the rnobilization of resources, it is noticed that the agricul-
tura! activity was perceived as essential for the sustenance of military forces 
(Lewis 2007). Thus, while the commercial and handicraft sectors suffered 
penalties, agriculture in small farms received state incentives. lhe irrigation 
canais and roads created at that time were intended to flow more efficient-
ly and to increase military mobility (Hui 2005, 172). Besides, according to 
Rosenstein (2009, 26), a strict redistribution of land was promoted, in ex-
change for the recognition o f land ownership for the peasants to be acquies-
cent about paying taxes and providing military service. On the other hand, the 
population increase was pursued through subsidies granted to couples with 
more than two children and incentives for the entry of immigrants. Thus, not 
only the population of Qin increased in absolute terms, but also compared to 
the other kingdoms. In this context, "with the ability to engage in total mobi-
lization of national resources, Qin's power and wealth reached a new height" 
(Hui 2005, 84). 
Increasing their material abilities compared to their competitors en-
abled more aggressive externai actions'o on the part of the Qin Kingdorn. 
Victoria Tin-bor Hui argues that, by having a bureaucratic body formed in a 
meritocratic way, Qin developed strategies that exploited the collective action 
problems'r inherent in the balancing alliances eventually articulated against 
30 For an analysis of the relationship between increased state power in the domestic sphere 
and more aggressive extemal policies, see Zakaria (1998). 
31 As Mearsheimer (2001) stresses, "Putting together balancing coalitions quickly and making 
them function smoothly is often difficult, beca use it takes time to coordinate the efforts to pros· 
pective allies or member states, even when there is wide agreement on what needs to be done. 
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them (Hui 2005, 100). Thus, while in the period 656-357 BC the kingdom 
began only 7% of the wars involving the largest states of the system, between 
356-221 BC, it initiated 54% and won 92%. Of this total, only eight of the :fif-
ty-two wars fought by the kingdom found resistance in the form of alliances 
(Hui 2005, 78). Moreover, "anti-Qin alliances formed very slowly and infre-
quently, they did not have enough member to overpower Qin, they rarely had 
unified command, and they readily disintegrated" (H ui 2005, 79). As a result, 
in 293 BC Qin had already defeated the main forces ofhis dose neighbors: 
the kingdoms ofWei, Han and Chu. Around 257 BC, the kingdom controlled 
about half o f the system' s territory. In 2 36 BC, h e launched a final war of uni-
fication against the Qi state. As a conqueror of this conflict, the concentration 
o f force in the system was completed under the command o f the Qin Dynasty 
in 221 BC (Hui 2005, 64-79). 
One may question why the mechanism of socialization has not en-
couraged the emulation of the reforms and strategies pursued by the Qin 
Kingdom by rival political organizations. The author suggests that the specif-
ic trajectory of events made the accumulation of power a process of positive 
reinforcementP. In the first place, Qin's peripheral position made its initial 
expansion seem little threatening in relation to the multiple threats faced by 
each kingdom33. Second, after Qin conquered more than half o f the system, 
"even the combined capabilities of al1 six states would not match that of Qin" 
(H ui 2005, 77). In this way, the perception that the most appropriate behavior 
to ensure survival was not resistance, but subinission to the strongest stat&-4, 
spread among the other realms. 
It is worth summarizing the evolution of the agent-structure relation-
ship in the Qin Kingdom expansion process, according to the model proposed 
by Victoria Tin-bor Hui. At first, the anarchic structure of the system (E) in-
duced competition and encouraged similar behaviors among its units. Then 
the combination of exogenous variables (innovation and technological diffu-
sion) with responses from a specific agent (empowering reforms) changed 
Threatened states usually disagree over how the burdens should be distributed among alliance 
members. After all, states are self-interested actors with powerful incentives to minimize the 
costs they pay to contain an aggressor". 
32 According to Hardin (1963, 71), social power is a process of positive reinforcement. Through 
numerous stratagems a monopolist may attempt to manipulare the machinery of sodety in 
order to eliminate threats which aim to restore a natural balance. A monopolist in one area wi11 
tiy his power for others, without liinits. 
33 lt is important to note that not even the rulers of the Qin kingdom initially aimed at domi-
nating the system. According to the author, only in 287 BC was the first mention of such an 
objective in military strategy documents (Hui 2005, 100). 
34 On the relation between perceived threat and inability to form balandng alliances, see 
Schweller (2004). 
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the distribution of capabilities in the system and made the conquest and ad-
ministration of the dominated territories less costly. At last, the interactions, 
exemplified by the conflict between the anti-balancing strategies and the 
disorganized collective resistance of the other realms, favored the tendency 
of force concentration and resulted in an increase in the functional special-
ization of the system (E'). Therefore, the transformation of an intemational 
political system into a national political system took place. 
In conclusion, Hui's work suggests that the conjunction of techno-
logical transformations, empowering reforms, and strategies of destabilizing 
alliances can overcome the mechanism of the balance of power and make the 
concentration of means of coercion a process of positive reinforcement. Thus, 
the continuity of the existence of the IPS formed by the Chinese kingdoms 
was not assured, but was dependent on historical contingencies derived from 
the strategic interactions between the agents and the influence of contextu-
al variables. In the following section, the ontology and evolution of national 
political systems and states is evaluated. In this case, not only intemational 
competition matters, but also interactions between states, non-state organiza-
tions and individuais belonging to the different NPS. 
National Political Systems: state-building and regulated com-
petition 
Political systems are constituted by political organizations that cen-
tralize the coercive means, allowing the advance oflabor division among the 
other agents. However, as there is in intemational political systems, there is 
no iron law that ensures the continuity of the structure. Thus, it is not only 
the IPS existence, but also the survival of the states and NPS continuity are 
contingent phenomena. 
First, it is necessary to differentiate the states from the other units of 
the national political systems. According to Charles Tilly (1993, 46), states 
are coercive organizations, distinct from families and kinship groups and in 
some aspects have a manifest priority over ali other organizations within ex-
tensive territories. In turn, Stein (2oo8, 129) understands that organizations 
are "conceptually recognized entities that combine groups of people who 
follow defined common rules". Therefore, states constitute only one of the 
agents that form the NPS, which is also composed of non-state organizations 
and individuais. I ts specificity lies in its claim to a monopoly on the legitima te 
use ofthe means offorce in the demarcated territory (Weber 1999). 
State-forming processes occur when organizations monopolize the 
means of coercion in a social system (Tilly 1996). Such deals face opposi-
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tion from rival political organizations intemally, as well as threats from other 
units belonging to the IPS. In order to consolidate, states need to develop the 
means to extract and convert the resources produced in the national political 
system into material capacities for coping with domestic resistance and inter-
national competition (Giddens 2oor). 
Thus, it is noted that states are not formed by means of agreements 
between the sovereign and society, as suggested by contractualist approach-
es35, but they result from the efforts of monopolization of the coercive means 
by one organization to the detriment of others. Therefore, state-building pro-
cesses necessarily involve conflicts of interest between political organizations 
and the other components of NPSs. Indeed, Tilly (1985) argues that before 
providing security, they would be the rnain potential threat to individuais and 
non-state organizations. 
In the previous section, it was argued that the insecurity and the low 
functional specialization between the units predominated in the IPS in func-
tion ofthe anarchy. In turn, it has now been pointed out that states concen-
trate the means of coerdon on the famous systems. The difference in the 
distribution of the coercive means in each system has implications in the 
mechanisms that act in its evolutionary processes. In other words, a competi-
tion between NPS agents is subject to the pressures derived from a structure 
different from the one found in IPS. 
It follows from this distinction that, while in the IPS the action of 
the units is constrained by the insecurity derived from the uncertainty about 
the intentions of the other units, in the NPS the behavioral variation is de-
limited by a regulatory order imposed by the state organization. Max Weber 
defines regulatory order as the set of rules "that regulates other social actions 
and guarantees by means of this regulation the probabilities provided to the 
agents" (Weber 2010, 99). Because of this, the NPS diminishes individual 
insecurity insofar as the order restricts the means tolerated in the competitive 
interactions between the units. 
It is noted that competition and the mechanism of socialization are 
not eliminated, but opera te differently. I t is argued that the fundamental dif-
ference is that in a system in which there is a regulatory order imposed by the 
state, the survival of agents does not depend on their own capabilities. Con-
sequently, in these systems the incentives and constraints derived from the 
35 By contractualism, it is meant •an those political theories that see the origin of society and 
the basis of political power in a contract, that is, a tacit agreement or expressed between the 
rnajority of individuais, an agreement that would signify the end of the natural state and the 
beginning of the social and political state" (Matteucci 1998, 272). For an evaluation of contrac-
tualist approaches to state fonnation processes, see Moore (2oo8). 
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structure make it possible to increase the functional speàalization between 
the units (Elias 1993). 
According to Waltz (1986, 324), the increase in functional speàal-
ization occurs when the division of labor between the units of the system 
increases. No longer concemed with physical threats, agents may fail to seek 
coercive means and perform speàfic activities that are embedded in the func-
tioning of the collectivity. Hence, ifiPS were characterized by functional sim-
ilarity between sovereign units, the soàal division oflabor that makes them 
interdependent would integrate NPS agents (Doyle rg86). 
Thus, the increase in functional speàalization is inextricable from the 
forrnation of political organizations that concentrate coeràve means and en-
sure orders ofbehavioral regulation. That is, it is only when "peaceful soàal 
spaces are created that the pressures that act upon people in these spaces are 
different from those that existed before" (Elias 1993, 198). In these spaces, 
socialization constrains the agents to repress impulses of physical aggression. 
Because of this, the nature of competition differs, with the survival of the unit 
no longer at stake, but its positioning in a wide and integrated network of 
interactions (Elias 1993, 132). 
However, it is argued that increasing functional speàalization in a 
national political system does not entail eliminating conflicts of interest be-
tween its units. So, what is the nature of competition in a system in which 
there is a regulatory order imposed by state organization? We use Max We-
ber's distinction between the concepts of power and dominationJ6 to advance 
this issue. According to Weber: "power means ali probability, within a social 
relation, to impose self-will even against resistance, whatever the basis of that 
probability" (Weber 2010, 102). In turn, "domination will be called the prob-
ability of finding obedience to an order of certain content in certain people" 
(Weber 2010, 102). 
Dueto the absence of a central authority, relations of power predomi-
nate in IPS. That is, there is no strong regulation ofthe means by which one 
poli ti cal organization triesJ7 to impose its will on the othersJ8• In turn, it was 
36 On the concept of power, see Dahl (1961), Gidd.ens (2001), and Lukes (2004). The Weberian 
definition is used to emphasize the distinction between social systems in which there is no 
superior regulation of the means by which an agent can impose his will on another, of social 
systems in which there is a regulating order delimiting the acceptable behaviors by the units. 
37 It is important to emphasize the importance ofthe term to try, since, as Giddens (2001, 36) 
points out, "an agent may be in a position of power in order to be able to employ a range of 
resources. Nevertheless, how far these resources can be used to ensure specific results depends 
on ensuring any consents that are needed from other agents". 
38 As argued above, such a configuration does not imply randomness of results or even chaos, 
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defined that the states concentrate the means of coercion and establish reg-
ulatory orders on the behavior of the other agents of the NPS. Thus, in this 
type of system, obedience to the delimited behaviorallimits is configured as a 
relation of domination and authority between govemors and the govemed. 
Weber argues that a regulatory order "exists when there is a probabili-
ty that it wil1 be maintained by a specific cadre of people who will use physical 
compulsion with the intention of achieving order compliance or enforcing 
penalties for their violation" (Weber 1981, 61). In other words, to the extent 
that: "for the very ful:fillment of a 'minimal' agenda, the State cannot com-
pletely avoid interfering in the economic life of the community that sustains 
it" (Reis 2003, 65), its consolidation requires not only the concentration of 
means of force, but also the creation of administrative institutions necessary 
for intervention in society (Bendix 1976, 23)39. 
That is, although the possession of coercive means is a necessary con-
dition for the imposition of the regulatory order, state domination becomes 
unsustainable ifit is based only on coercion (Buzan 1984, 53). As Wong (1997, 
74) argues: "coercive control is expensive, labor intensive, and sometimes 
capital intensive". Therefore, even though the concentration of the means 
of force is fundamental to behavioral regulation, states are unable to sustain 
themselves without the acquiescence o f other organizations within society'1°. 
Thus, "the question oflegitimacy becomes fundamental, since it alone would 
be the ultimate guarantee of the subsistence of a political association" (Bi-
anchi 2014, IOO)"~r. Hence, state agents would strive to consolidate the rela-
tions of domination by "acts of persuasion, such as the creation of beliefs in 
the morality, sensibility, necessity, or desirability of a certain kind of social 
order" (Wong 1997, 74). In other words: 
but behavior pattems that emerge in a decentralized way from behavioral expectations derived 
from the distribution of force in the system. 
39 According to Max Weber (r99r, 96): "lhe qualitative and quantitative development of ad-
rnirústrative tasks inevitably favors, in the long term, the effective continuity of at least some 
of the employees, because technical superiority in the administration of public affairs, In a 
more sensitive way, in training and experience. Therefore, there is always the probability that a 
special and perennial social formation will be constituted for administrative purposes, and this 
at the same time means: for the exercise of domination". 
40 According to Miguel Centeno (2002, ro6): "the capacity of a state to extract resources will 
be closely linked to the willingness of the population to accept these burdens". 
4r Legitimacy is defined as "an attribute ofthe State, which consists in the presence, in a signi-
ficant part of the population, of a degree of consensus capable of ensuring o bedience without 
the necessity of resorting to the use of force, except in sporadic cases. It is for this reason that ali 
power seeks to reach consensus, so that it is recogni2ed as legitimate, transforming obedience 
into adhesion" (Levi r998, 675). 
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If the State can rely on the population's adherence to the norrns in force, 
not only to comply with them routinely, but also to punish rec.alàtrant or 
at least denounce them to the competent authorities then it is liàt to ex-
pect a more effiàent performance ofpolitic.al institutions {Reis 2003, 63). 
That is, "states must have a physical base of population and territory; 
they must have goveming institutions of some sort which control the physical 
base; and there must be some idea of the state which establishes its authority 
in the minds ofits people" (Buzan 1984, 40). In short, state domination over 
the other components of the NPS is sustained by the concentration of coer-
cive means and the legitimacy o f the regulatory order42 • 
However, it is still necessary to explain how the concentration of the 
means of force, the establishment of a regulatory order, and the functional 
specialization themselves condition the interactions between individuais and 
non -state organizations. 
It has been argued that the survival of units (organizations and indi-
viduais) is reasonably guaranteed in the interactions that take place within 
national political systems where there is a state monopoly of coercive means 
and a regulatory order. However, conflicts of interest do not occur exclusively 
through coercion. In fact: "there is a whole set of means whose monopoliza-
tion allows man, as a group or individual, to impose his will on others" (Elias 
1993, 146)43. Therefore, in the NPS "groups, whose social existence is mu-
tually dependent, through the division of functions, still struggle for certain 
opportunities. They are both opponents and partners" (Elias 1993, 147). Thus, 
as Lockwood (1956, 139) points out, the increased division oflabor resulting 
from pacification is also the cause of new conflicts o f interest. 
In this case, Weber argues that competition occurs around specific 
life opportunities, arising from the positioning of units in the distribution 
structure of economic and social orders (Weber 1981, 62-63). lhe author 
called this type of competition as regulated competition: "to the extent that 
it is directed, in ends and means, by an order" (Weber 2010, 72)++. That is, 
4.2 It is important to note that the use of coercion is not restricted to the international arena. 
lhe relevant distinction for this article is that in national political systems, with the exception 
of state organizations, agents do not organize collectively to threaten or use physical force to 
defend their interests. When they do, they are subject to the penalties defined in the regulatory 
arder and imposed by the state organization. 
43 As Pasquino (1998, 226) argues, "violence can be considered a usable instrurnent in a social 
or political conflict, but not the only and not necessarily the most effective one". 
44 According to Weber (1981, 63): "we can call 'social arder' the form by which social honor 
is distributed in a community among typical groups participating in that distribution. The 
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even if there is regulation of the means tolerated in social competition, the 
agent's position in the division oflabor wi1l provide greater - or less - access 
to the resources needed to defend his interests in the NPS (Hay and Wincott 
1998, 956)45. Therefore, although the means used by regulated competition 
are variable, it is considered that: 
lhe processes of constitution of society are very often simply commitments 
of antagonistic interests, which neutralize only part of the object or the 
means of struggle, but leave, in the end, opposition of interests and com-
petition around probabilities. And the ordering of social action, regardless 
of its kind, leaves, as it were, any effective selection in the competition of 
the different human types around the probabilities o f life anyway (Weber 
2010, 8o). 
Three distinct dimensions of conflict involving the states are thus ev-
idenced: intemational competition, due to the behavioral insecurity derived 
from the anarchic structure of the IPS; the construction of the state itself, 
fraught with tension between the state and the other organizations and indi-
viduais of the NPS (especially regarding the extraction of resources for exter-
nai defense, monopolization of internai coercion and imposition of the regu-
latory order); and regulated competition, represented by conflicts o f interest 
between non -state organizations and individuais around the distribution of 
resources, provide access to specific life opportunities (fable 2). 
Table 2: Dimensions of the Conflict involving the IPS and NPS Agents 
Types of Conflict Agents Means 
lnternational Competition States belonging to IPS 
Material Capabilities for 
War 
Construction of the State 
State, organizations and indi- Coercion and legitimacy 
viduals belonging to the NPS formation 
Regulated Competition 
Non-state organizations and Delimited by the regulatory 
individuais order imposed by the state 
Source: Elaborated by the authors 
social order and the economic order are both, of course, related to the 'legal order'. However, 
the social and economic order are not identical. The economic order is for us only the way in 
which economic goods and services are distributed. The social order is obviously conditioned 
to a high degree by the economic order, and in turn reacts to it". 
45 According to Elias (1993, 105): "thanks to centralization and monopolization, opportunities 
that were previously to be won by individuais with military or economic force become amena-
ble to planning. From a point of development, the struggle for monopolies no longer aims at 
their destruction. lt is a struggle for control of what they produce, for a plan according to which 
their burden and benefits are further divided, in a word, by the keys to distribution". 
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The three types of conflicts are linked. lt should be noted, for exam-
ple, that the regulatory arder imposed by the state is not neutral in relation 
to regulated competition. That is, "the structure of any legal order directly 
influences the distribution of power, economic or otherwise" (Weber 1981, 
6r). Thus, the benefits derived from the arder sustained by the states tend to 
be directed towards the agents who dominate and provide them with the re-
sources necessary for their purposes (Mann 1992, IJ). This condition is made 
explicit in taxation, whose stipulation is the result of political pressures and 
counter pressions (Reis 2003, 65). 
Hence, the existence of a regulatory arder implies the continuation of 
conflicts of interest in the system, since "the imposition of arder necessarily 
resolves the conflict on terms favorable to either party" (Clarke 1991, 4). Thus, 
the other agents dispute the nature of the arder imposed by the state, insofar 
as it defines the behavioral expectations ofthe competition between them (Lu-
stick 20n, 2). That is, although states establish relations of domination over 
individuais and non-state organizations, they are also a necessary condition 
for increasing the division oflabor that allows the integration ofNPS them-
selves. However, the arder that underpins the increase in functional special-
ization is not neutral, favoring the interests of certain agents in exchange for 
acquiescence and support for state domination (Elias 1993). At the limit, it is 
such asymmetries and biases that fuel revolutions andf o r reforms in national 
political systems over time (Cepik 1999). 
In addition, state domination is contextually variable (Stein 2008, 
r64). To the extent that govemors legitimately concentrate the resources 
necessary to survive in the IPS and monopolize the means of coercion in 
the NPS, they will not only have greater freedom of externai action but also 
greater autonomy from the other organizations and individuais that make up 
the political systems national authorities. On the other hand, if the resourc-
es needed to implement these imperatives are concentrated on other actors, 
state interventions will tend to be constrained and reflect their interests (Gid-
dens 2001, r6o). 
Among the mechanisms that interfere with the way in which intema-
tional competition influences state-building and regulated competition, war 
(Posen 1993; Tilly 1975; Tilly 1985; Tilly 1996; Herbst 2ooo; Centena 2002; 
Hui 2005). 
Charles Tilly, for example, argues that the evolution of nation-states 
in Europe in the period 990-199046 was the result of rulers' efforts to mo-
46 It is import:ant to emph.asize th.at the analysis of long temporal processes generates as 
weakness the omission of speci:fic events in the evolutionary trajectories of each case. It is re-
cognized that such contingent events on certain occasions play a decisive role in determining 
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nopolize means of coercion intemally and to face intemational competition 
(Tilly 1996). Compelled by externai threats, the states increased the extrac-
tion of resources from the other components of the NPS47. To the extent that 
such agents resisted state-owned enterprises, conditions for the provision of 
resources were barred..S. Thereby, in exchange for the material and human 
resources necessary for wars, the state organization granted political and f or 
social rights by modifying the NPS regulatory orders. 
However, there were regional variations in the construction trajecto-
ries of nation-states. The author points out as a factor responsible for these 
distinctions the differences of state capacity that each ruler possessed to im-
pose his domination over the holders of capital in each territory. This dif-
ference would have been responsible for changes in two dimensions: how 
resources were extracted; and what are the characteristics of the orders that 
regulated the behavior of the units. Three ideal types of trajectory would be 
observable: intensive in coercion, highly capitalized, and an optimal trajectory 
(from the point of view of the nation-state) of capitalized coercion (Tilly 1996, 
203)-
At one extreme, in the predominantly agrirultural areas, few cities 
with little capital (Russia, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Sicily and Castile), rul-
ers used coercive strategies to extract resources, wage wars and control or-
der in their territories49. The confrontation of international competition was 
which organization would triumph over the other. However, it is considered that the selection 
mechanisms derived from the structure of the European intemational política! system acted 
generally índependently of such accidents, encouraging the centralization of política! power in 
larger states. On the advantages and disadvantages of evaluating long time processes, see Tilly 
(1983)· 
47 Although, at the end of the period evaluated by the author, this process has promoted the 
convergence of the formats of the European política! organizations towards the nation-state, 
this trajectory would not have occurred in a lineai way. In fact, there have been the fonnation 
of política! organizations with extremely varied characteristics. City-states, dty leagues, king-
doms, ecclesiastical potentates, and empires coexist in the European intemational política! 
system. See Spruyt (1994). 
48 According to Kliemt and Ahlert (zoiJ, 47), bargains occur when: "humans are engaged in 
'antagonistic cooperation' and have to negotiate agreements on matters such as prices, wages, 
and regulations concerning personal, group, and international relations. Bargaining parties 
have partly opposing interests and need to negotiate how to comprornise them to the advantage 
of all concerned". About the relationship between bargaining, taxation, and state formation, see 
Moore (zoo8, 37). 
49 According to Tilly, the Russian case is the ideal model of the coercive strategy. After Tsar 
Ivan IV (1533-84) conquered conflicts with the agrarian nobility, he would have come to benefit 
state officials with expropriated lands. In a second moment, agrarian landowners and state 
agents lined up around the exploitation of peasant labor. By imperial decrees, the peasants were 
fixed or transferred to certain territories. In 1700, Peter the Great issued a decree according to 
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financed by the exploitation of a peasant mass subject to a regulatory order 
maintained more by the alliance between rulers, landowners and state offi-
cials (filly 1996, 213). 
At the other extreme, in areas with dense networks of cities and abun-
dance of capital (Flanders, northem Italy, and the Netherlands), rulers em-
ployed capital-intensive strategies. The presence of a powerful merchant class 
established "serious limits to the direct exercise by the state of controlling 
individuais and families, but facilitated the application of relatively efficient 
and painless rates on trade" (filly 1996, 161)5°. In the absence of agricultura! 
areas, the conflicts in which these states were involved were bome by loans, 
customs duties, and excise taxes. Control of trade routes was defined in quick 
battles fought by low-cost mercenary forces. Such means did not require large 
bureaucratic apparatus, being administered by employees of the families of 
merchants and bankers. Therefore, the preparation for intemational compe-
tition and the regulatory order was sustained by commercial and financiai 
profits (filly rgg6, 223). 
In an intermediate position were the rulers who used strategies of 
capitalized coercion (England, France and Prussia). In these cases, there was 
less asymmetry between landowners, merchants and petty bourgeois in cities. 
The greater balance ensured less reliance on coercive aspects in extractive 
activity - compared to strategies of intensive coercion - while at the same time 
resulting in increased state capacity for penetration into society - compared to 
those who adopted capital intensive strategies. Consequently, the regulatory 
order in these NPS counted "with the acquiescence ofboth landowners and 
merchants" and established regulated competition in which "nobles faced fi-
nanciers, but in the end ended up collaborating with them" (Tilly 1996, 161). 
Finally, Tilly (1996, 268) states that this type of state prevailed over others 
because ofits greater ability to support armies with its own resources. 
The hypothesis of Tilly's model is that intemational competition 
was intermediated by the way in which regulated competition and the con-
struction of the state - represented by the interactions between mercantile 
classes, agrarian nobility, peasants and state agents - was structured in each 
region (filly 1996, 76). In addition, it suggests that the consolidation of the 
nation-state as the predominant unit in the system was not the only possible 
path of evolution (Spruyt 1994). That is, although the increase in intemation-
al competition led to the mobilization of resources by the units, there was a 
time lag until the socialization mechanism operated to converge the regulato-
which every freed servant was to go immedia.tely to military service, and if he was refused he 
should submitto another master (Tilly 1996, 212) . 
50 In thls case, the trajectory ofVenice is the ideal case presented by the author. 
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ry orders of the NPS (Tilly 1994, 94). 
If the variation in the relations between coercion and capital were 
pointed out as the cause of the initial divergence in the nation-state formation 
processes, transformations in the shape of military and police forces would 
be responsible for subsequent convergence (Finer 1975; Tilly 1975; Paret 
1986)51• That is, if intemational competition initially led to the mobilization 
of resources, a:fter the transformations in the means that sustained the use 
of force the mechanism of socialization selected the political organizations 
whose reforms best adapted to such changes. 
First, there was an increase in the scale of resources used in interna-
tional competition. According to Mann (1993, 371), "states were fighting ma-
jor wars for two-thirds of the time, involving progressively greater demands 
on manpower, taxation, and agricultura! and industrial production"s~. There-
fore, the number of combatants has increased consistently. In this context, 
it was evidenced that armed forces formed only by knights of the nobility 
and mercenaries were not able to face armies composed of thousands of con-
scripted, trained and disdplined soldiers (Tones 1987, 150). As a result, the es-
tablishment of established and permanent forces gradually took over (Porter 
1994)· 
Second, the entry of the masses into the theaters of operations was 
made possible by technological innovations in military equipment that di-
minished the predominance of the nobility in the fighting. lighter cartridg-
es, as well as the inventions of musket, shotgun and bayonet increased the 
efficiency of light infantry over heavy cavalry (Tones 1987)5'. The spread of 
gunpowder increased the range of artillery and diminished the importance of 
castles as military fortifications (Giddens 2001, 132). 
The nature of the new equipment required more standardization 
of collective actions, which in turn required discipline, hierarchy, and con-
stant training of soldiers in times of peace (Finer 1975)54. The achievements 
)I Itwill follow the model proposed by Finer (1975, go), who considers that the •format ofthe 
military forces» consists of two dimensions: (i) the recruitment and the service of the soldiers: 
if they are native or foreign, or voluntary, ad hoc or permanent; and (ü) the size of the armed 
forces, the composition of arms, and the social stratification of force. 
52 In addition, the number of deaths per combat increased from J,ooo per year in the 16th 
century to over 22J,ooo per year during the 2oth century (Tilly 1996, 131). 
53 According to Barry Posen: •The widespread employrnent of skirmishers in •open order" 
seems to have spread fairly quickly after the revolution, and persisted to some degree in most 
European armies. I t was hard to fight the French without adopting their methods" (Posen 1993, 
94)· 
54 Black (1991, 83) considers that •the ability to strike fust and hard, as France did against the 
Dutch in 1672, andagainstAustria in 1733 and 1741, andas Prussia did againstAustriain 1740, 
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of states that adopted such measures pressured their opponents to emulate 
them (Black 1991). Consequently, "the modem cornrnand arrny thus ernerged 
on the stage of Europe, highly disciplined and conceived as a pliant instru-
rnent of state authority" (Porter 1994, 162). 
Both the need to supply and coordinate larger contingents, and the 
irnperative of rnass production of equiprnent, the financiai costs and logis-
tical, strategic, and operational requirernents of war have expanded (Finer 
1975Ps. Such needs have led to an increase in state's ability to intervene on 
NPS. According to Michael Mann (1993, 369): "It is probable that late eight-
eenth-century states had the highest fiscal extraction rates the world had seen 
before the wars ofthe twentieth century". Bruce Porter (1994, 166) points out 
that in this period "finance departrnents, reeling frorn the spiraling costs of 
war, faced drastic overhaul and rationalization"S6• Thus, preparation for the in-
ter-state wars produced consequently states with increasingly robust adrninis-
trative apparatus. 
The changes in the resources needed to cape with the war in Europe 
evidenced that the survival of the states depended on the extraction of resourc-
es from the entire NPS (Hobsbawrn 1992). Consequently, the parameters of 
competition between states, individuais and non-state organizations have also 
been altered. On the one hand, the lesser role of the nobility in wars increased 
the autonorny of state agents in relation to this group (Kennedy 1989). That 
is, "war has taken a course which has made fragrnented and small-scale sov-
ereignty a clear disadvantage" (Tilly 1996, 121). Hence, the ability of aristocra-
cies to rnaintain arrned forces independent of central govemrnents has dete-
riorated (Black 1991, 83)51. Thus, the tendency of centralization of the rneans 
produced obvious benefits for rulers who retained a large peacetime army. Their actions were 
watched with concem by other powers and only they enjoyed a real freedom of manoeuvre in 
intemational relations. As a result there was considerable pressure in certain states to increase 
the level of military preparedness, an ex:pensive business". On the other hand. according to 
Finer (1975, 99), the first permanent military forces arose in 445 in France, in 1645 in En-
gland, in 166o in Prussia and in 1707 in Russia. 
55 Posen (1993, 83) argues that the essence of the mass army is its ability to maintain combat 
power in the face of the challenges posed by friction in the campaigns. Thus, not only are the 
imperatives of command, control, and logistics enormous, but maintaining political motiva-
tion, education, and training large contingents are challenges for state agents. 
56 According to Mann (1993, 393), the percentage of state employees in relation to the total 
population between q6o and 1910 increased from o.o6% to 1.17% in Austria, from 0.26% 
to 14% in France, From 0.18% to o.64% in England and from 0.33% to 1.57% in Prussiaj 
Germany. 
57 According to Black (1991, 83), •the armies retained by weaker powers did not compare with 
those of the major states, one of the significant military and political developments of the post-
r66o period being their increasing discrepancy". 
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of force in political units with greater territorial extension was consolidated. 
On the other hand, the participation of the masses in the fighting led 
to the reformulation of the terms in which state domination was legitimized. 
The effects were the emergence ofthe national ideal as a source oflegitima-
cy; and the increasing civil demands on states, including, at the limit, the 
revolutionary action of the previously subaltern working masses (Hobsbawm 
1992). That is, if nationalism was operationalized by European rulers as a 
tool for ideological mobilization and homogenization of populations within 
their territories, it also served as a justification for claims for the extension 
of access to civil, political and social rights in the regulatory orders (Marshall 
1973)58• The contrast between Admirai Nelson's speech before the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1808: "England expects every manto do his duty" (Hobsbawm 
1992, 150), with the slogan "one man, one vote, one gun" spread during the 
conflicts surrounding the extension of suffrage in Sweden at the beginning of 
the twentieth century (Bendix 1976, 115) illustrates the relationship between 
mass military mobilization, a national ideal, and increasing demands on the 
state. 
Therefore, if reforms in this period increased the capacity for state 
intervention in the NPS, they also altered the correlation of forces among 
the agents involved in regulated competitions9. Bendix (1978, 28) argues that, 
as public administration expanded, access to official positions was separated 
from hereditary o r proprietary cri teria. Other authors note that the establish-
ment of free public education systems (Posen 1993) accompanied policies of 
linguistic unification60• Michael Mann (1993) points out that state spending 
58 T. H. Marshall (1973) distinguishes three types of citizenship rights: civil, political and social. 
Civil rights would be those that would guarantee freedorn of association, speech and justice in 
relation to accusations of inappropriate behavior. Political rights deal with the participation 
of individuais in the exercise of political power. Social rights refer to the prerogative of each 
individual to have minimum standards of security and econornic well-being within the NPS. 
59 For a detailed evaluation of the process of centralization of public administration and the 
means of force in state political organizations during this period, see Bendix (1976), Elias 
(1993), Giddens (2001). The passage from the work ofReinhard Bendix (1976), which sums up 
the fundamental distinction between the way in which the regulative orders was sustained in 
the medieval period and in the nation-states, is reproduced here: "In the medieval conception 
the "building block" of the social order is the family ofhereditary privilege, whose stability over 
time is the foundation of right and of authority, while the rank-order of society and its transinis-
sion through inheritance regulates the relations among such families and between them and 
the supreme ruler. The modem nation-state presupposes that this link between governmental 
authority and inherited privileges in the hands of farnilies of notables is broken" (Bendix 1976, 
138). 
6o As Posen (1993, 120) points out: •mass literacy makes it possible for states to train Iarger 
annies in peacetime and mobilize them in wartime with greater speed. In addition, it mak.es 
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on education and well-being between 1870 and 1910 increased by soo% in 
France, 399% in Germany and 638% in the United Kingdom. Benedict An-
derson (2oo8) assesses that the development of the press not only increased 
the ability to disseminate law codes, reporting and gathering information, but 
also strengthened national identity through the mass media. On the other 
hand, Helleiner (1998) and Lauer (2oo8) demonstrate how the creation of 
national currenàes facilitated taxation, increased the capacity of intervention 
in the economy and spread messages with national content. In other words, 
from the conjunction between technological transformations and the strate-
gies of contrai and social mobilization used by the rulers emerged the condi-
tions that transformed the subjects into àtizens of the nation. 
Thus, the consequences of the preparations for competition in the 
European IPS during the nineteenth century engendered a tendency not only 
to increase centralization of political authority in the NPS but also to transfer 
contrai of the monopoly of the means of force and the sphere's regulatory 
arder Private - monarchy and nobility - to the public sphere (Elias 1993)61• 
That is, through measures that broadened the political participation of the 
population; Bureaucratized the administrative apparatus; and expanded the 
social expenditures and social functions ofthe states, "regimes obtained from 
peasants and workers not, as in agrarian societies, a particularistic loyalty 
to lineage and locality but an emerging loyalty to the universal nation-state" 
(Mann 1993, 501). 
Here again, it is worth summarizing the relationship between agents, 
structure and exogenous variables in the process of nation-state formation 
in Europe. Initially, states with distinct resource mobilization strategies and 
regulatory orders (A) coexisted on the continent. In a second step, the scale of 
the resources needed to cope with the constraints imposed by the structure of 
the European IPS (E) changes as a result of technological and organizational 
innovations in the form of military forces. Finally, the socialization-selection 
mechanism removes the units incapable of adapting to the new demands of 
international competition, consolidating the nation-state as the predominant 
political organization in European IPS (A'). 
soldiers more accessible to propaganda, both as children and as adults, which facilitates the 
spread of nationalist ideology". 
61 Norbert Elias describes such a processas: "the monopolyprivately owned by a single indivi-
dual or family falls under the control of a broader social stratum and becomes a central organ 
ofthe state in a public monopoly" (Elias 1993, 101). Anthony Giddens stresses, "while the road 
to sovereignty generates a centralization of resources in the hands of rulers, it fosters a wides-
pread awareness that political power depends on collective capabilities, that the figure of the 
monarch May perhaps symbolizes, but for which the traditional adornments of the real domain 
have little relevance" (Giddens 2001, 217). 
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In conclusion, two hypotheses are considered implicit in Tilly's ex-
planatory model. The first is that the way in which the competition in the 
European NPSs was delimited during the medieval period constrained the 
options of strategies used by the rulers to face the international competition. 
Thus, it is noted that the trajectory of the interactions that determined the 
evolution of the structure of the European IPS was dependent on the course 
of events that occurred previously within each national political system. In 
addition, the long period of coexistence between states with regulatory orders 
and strategies for mobilizing distinct resources suggests the difficulty (and 
possible undesirability) of establishing ideal models of political organization. 
In fact, exogenous variations were necessary for the socialization-selection 
mechanism to converge the shape of the military forces and to consolidate the 
nation-state as the predominant unit in the system. 
The second is that an exogenous variable - technological innovation 
of military systems - has had e:ffects on the dimensions of state building and 
regulated competition. The increase in the scale of the necessary resources 
and the changes in the nature of the equipment made the participation of the 
masses in the wars condition necessary for the survival in the European IPS. 
Because of this, the correlation of forces between the rulers, non-state organ-
izations and individuais was altered: the inf1.uence of the nobility on the state 
was reduced; Conditions have arisen for the claim o f the extension of civil, po-
li ti cal and social rights in the regulatory orders; and nationalism consolidated 
as a source oflegitimacy for state domination. 
Simultaneous analysis of contemporary processes of internation-
al and national competition would enable us to better understand how the 
mechanisms involved (especially war) are producing the emergence of new, 
regulated orders, structures of authority, and even altering the very nature of 
the intemational system. 
Conclusions 
The article investigated the ontology of intemational political systems, 
national political systems and states, as well as the effects that competition be-
tween their respective agents produces in their evolutionary processes. In or-
der to do so, we resorted to the criticai revision of theoretical categories from 
three areas ofknowledge: Intemational Relations Theory, Historical Sociology 
and Strategic Studies. The resulting model sought to integrate the constraints 
imposed by the IPS structure, the constraints of state domination in the NPS, 
and the role of the use and threat of the use of force in intemational competi-
181 
Structu re and agency in lnternational Relations: state-building and the evolution of the I nternatio-
nal Political System 
tion. 
It has been assumed that both IP and NPS are open systems. Therefo-
re, the relation between units, structure and exogenous variables is not deter-
ministic in any sense. I t is only possible to integra te analyzes o f the agency' s 
role with assessments of structural constraints and incentives if the episte-
mologicallinúts and contingent character of the historical evolution of social 
systems are recognized (Braumoller 2012). 
In the first section, the relevance of the concepts of anarchy and low 
functional specialization present in Waltz's IPS model (1979) was defended. 
It was considered that these two elements do not imply the absence ofhie-
rarchical or cooperative relations between states, but rather that such asym-
metric interactions are conditioned by the distribution of power and perme-
ated by the behavioral uncertainty between the agents. That is, international 
politics remains "the realm of power, dispute and accommodation" (Waltz 
1979, II2). However, it has also been argued that these elements do not limit 
the possible trajectories of evolution of international political systems, but 
rather they enable multiple paths. In this way, there is nothing to ensure the 
reproduction of an anarchic political system over time. In fact, the result of 
the interaction between states, exogenous variables and competing mechanis-
ms may favor both decentralization and concentration of the force means. To 
illustrate the argument, the explanatory model of H ui (2005) on the process 
oftransformingthe IPS formed by Chinese kingdoms in 656 BC into an NPS 
dominated by the Qin Dynasty in 221 BC was followed. After ali, Qin King-
dom rivais were also Political organizations that aimed to survive in an anar-
chic system. However, the mechanisms for restoring power decentralization 
were not enough to prevent system integration. In that context, strengthening 
reforms and strategies to destabilize alliances have made the coercion means 
concentration a process of positive reinforcement. 
In the second section, we analyzed the effect of international compe-
tition on the evolutionary process of national states and political systems. It 
has been found that the concentration of the means of coercion in a specific 
unit the state alters the means used in competition between the agents 
forming the NPS. According to the actors and means involved, three dimen-
sions of conflict were delimited: international competition among IPS units; 
construction of the state; and regulated competition between non-state orga-
nizations and individuais around the specific life opportunities in NCPs cen-
tralized in national states. It was argued that the preparation of the agents and 
the result of the clashes in each dimension generates consequences for the 
evolution of the objects of analysis in the other dimensions. In the end, the 
formation of the nation-states in Europe was evaluated from the explanatory 
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model proposed by Tilly (1996). In that case, the ways in which state-building 
and regulated competition stabilized constrained the strategies available to 
rulers to face international competition later; the long period of coexistence 
between states with regulatory orders and distinct resource mobilization stra-
tegies has suggested the impossibility of establishing ideal models of political 
organization; And technological and organizational variations in the format 
of the military forces competing in the IPS have had e:ffects on state-building 
and regulated competition. 
Finally, we concluded that the research agenda that deals with the 
necessary requirements for the "defense of the state" must be inseparable 
from discussions about "what (or whom) the state serves for". In addition, the 
analysis indicates the progressivity of the following research problem: under 
what conditions competitive interactions between agents contribute to the 
emergence of political organizations capable of surviving, acting in the inter-
national political system, and providing security, welfare, and political rights 
for its citizens? This remains a central political issue in the 21st century. 
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ABSTRACT 
Conflicts are intrinsic to social systems and constitute an irreducible part of their 
development. This article analyzes the conflict between states and its effects on the 
evolutionary dynamics of the intemational political system. We discuss the ontology 
of each object of analysis and the causal mechanisms that connect their respective 
evolving trajectories. Then, the analytical model is evaluated regarding to the processes 
of formation of the Qin Empire in China and the construction of Nation-States in 
Europe. The working hypothesis is that the interactions among the strategies chosen 
by the agents to cope with the structural constrains and competition conditions they 
encounter cause changes in the international political systems, as well as on the 
actors themselves. 
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